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Abstract 
Subjective judgments, whether by experts or lay people, are a· 
major component ih any risk assessment. If such judgments are faulty, 
risk management efforts are likely to be misdirected. This paper 
begins with an analysis of biases exhibited by lay people and experts 
when they make judgments about risk. Next the similarities and differences 
between lay and expert evaluations are examined in the context of a 
specific set of hazardous activities and technologies. Finally, insights 
from this research are applied to the problems of informing people about 
risk and forecasting public response towards nuclear power. 
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People respond to the hazards they perceive.· If their perceptions 
are faulty, efforts at personal, public and environmental protection are 
likely to be misdirected. For some hazards, such as motor vehicle 
accidents, extensive statistical data are.available to guide perceptions. 
For other familiar activities, such as .the consumption of alcohol and 
tobacco, assessment of risk requires complex epidemiological and 
experimental studies. Still other hazards, such as those associated with 
nuclear power, are sufficiently new that risk assessment must be based on 
complex theoretical analyses such as fault ·trees, rather than on direct 
experience. 
Despite an appearance of objectivity, .all forms of risk assessment 
include a large component::of subjective judgment. Someone, relying on 
educated intuition, must determine the structure of the problem, decide 
the consequences to be considered and select tli.e :i;:elevarit d,ata and--interpret 
' - .,.. ~- ·. . 
to those who actually manage hazards, including industrialists, environ-.-, 
mentalists, regulators,, legislators, and voters. If these people do not 
\ 
understand or believe the data they are shown, then distrust, conflict, 
and ineffective hazard management are likely. 
This paper explores some psychological elements of the risk-assessment 
process. Its basic premises are that both the public and the experts are 
necessary participants in that process, that assessment is inherently 
subjective and prone to distortion due to judgmental limitations, and 
that understanding perceptions is crucial to effective decision making. 
2 
Judgmental Biases in Risk Perception 
When lay people are asked to evaluate risks, they ·seldom have 
statistical evidence on hand. In most cases, they m~st make inferences 
based on what they remember hearing or observing about the risk in 
question. Research has identified a number of general inferential rules 
that people use in such situations. These rules, known as heuristics, are 
employed to reduce difficult mental tasks to simpler ones. Although they 
are valid in some circumstances, in others they lead to large and persistent 
biases with serious implications. 
Availability 
One inferential strategy that has special relevance for risk perception 
is the availabilitx heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). People using 
this heuristic judge an event as likely or frequent if instances of it 
are. easy to imagine or recall. Because frequently occurring events are 
generally easier to imagine and recall than are rare events, availability 
is often an appropriate cue. However, availability is also affected by 
by numerous factors unrelated to frequency of occurrence. For example, a 
recent disaster or a vivid film could seriously bias risk judgments. 
Availability bias, helps explain people's misperceptions and faulty 
decisions.with regard to certa~n natural hazards. Kates (1962) observed 
that· residents of flood plains appeared to be 11prisoners of their 
experience," unable to conceptualize floods that have never occurred or 
to see the future as anything but a mirror of the recent past. 
One particularly important implication of the availabili~y heuristic 
is that discussing a low-probability hazard may increase its imaginability 
and, hence, its perceived riskiness, regardless of what the evidence 
indicates. For example, leaders in the field of recombinant DNA research 
quickly regretted ever bringing to public attention the remote risks of 
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contamination by newly created organisms. Many discussions of the issue 
completely lost sight of the fact that the dangers were hypothetical and 
assumed that recombinant DNA laboratories were full of raging beasts. 
Ultimately, the very scientists whose concerns had initiated these 
discussions were vilified. 
Judged frequency of lethal events. Availability bias is illustrated 
by several studies in which people judged the frequency of 41 causes of 
death (Lichtenstein et al., 1978). In one study, these people were first 
told the annual death toll in the United States (50,000) for orie cause 
' 
(motor vehicle accidents) and then asked to estimate the frequency of the 
other 40. Figure 1 compares the judged number of deaths per year with the 
number reported in public health statistics. If the frequency judgments 
equaled the statistical rates, all data points would fall on the identity 
line. Although more likely hazards generally evoked higher estimates, the 
points were scattered about a curved line that lay sometimes above and 
sometimes below the line of accurate judgment. In general, rare causes of 
death were overestimated and common causes of death were und'erestimated. 
In addition to this general bias, sizable specific biases are evident in 
Figure 1. For example, accidents were judged to cause as many deaths as 
diseases, whereas diseases actually take about 15 times as many lives. 
Homicides were incorrectly judged more frequent than diabetes and stomach 
cancer deaths. Pregnancies, births and abortions were judged to take about as 
many lives as diabetes, though diabetes actually causes about 80 times more 
deaths. In keeping with availability considerations, overestimated causes of 
death (relative to the curved line) tended to be dramatic and sensational 
(accidents, natural disasters, fires, homicides), whereas underestimated 
cause's tended to be unspectacular events, which claim one victim at a time 
and are common in nonfatal form (e.g., smallpox vaccinations, stroke, 
diabetes, emphysema). 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
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Biased newspaper coverage and biased judgments. The availability 
heuristic highlights the vital role of experience as a determinant of 
perceived risk. If one's experiences are biased, one's perceptions are 
iikely to be inaccurate. Unfortunately, much of the information to which 
people are exposed provides a distorted picture of the world of hazards. 
Following. the sfody·-_described aoove, Comos and: Slovic (1979).··examined the-, 
• ' ' - -.._ -~ -·' - ·""- - - ' ,-. • - • - • s • ~ •• , • • • ~ ; ~. - -· 
reporting of causes of death in two newspapers on opposite coasts of the 
United States. Both newspapers exhibited similar biases in their coverage 
of life-threatening events. For example, violent, often catastrophic, 
events were reported_much more frequently than less dramatic causes of death 
having similar (or even greater) statistical frequencies. Moreover, these 
biases in newspaper coverage closely matched the biases in people's· 
perceptions, discovered in our earlier studies. 
It won't happen to me. Misleading experiences might also underlie 
another apparent judgmental bias~ people's predelection to view themselves 
as personally immune to many hazards. Research shows that the great 
majority of individuals believe themselves to be better than average drivers, -
more likely than average to live past 80, less likely than average to be 
harmed by products they use, and so on. Although such perceptions are 
obviously unrealistic, the risks may look very small from the perspective 
of each individual's experience. Consider automobile driving: despite 
driving too fast, tailgating, etc., poor drivers make trip after trip 
without mishap. This personal experience demonstrates to them their 
exceptional skill and safety. Moreover, their indirect experience via 
the news media shows that when accidents happen, they happen to others. 
Given such misleading experiences, people may feel quite justified in 
refusing to take protective actions such as wearing seat belts (Slavic 
· et al., 1978). 
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Out of sight, out of mind. In some situations, failure to appreciate 
the limits of "available" data may lull people into complacency. For 
example, we asked people to evaluate the completeness of a fault tree 
sh:twing the problems that could cause a car.'not to start when the ignition 
key was turned (Fischhoff et al. , 1978). Respond.e?ts' 'judgments of 
completeness were about the same when looking at the full tree as when 
looking at a tree in which half of the causes of starting failure were 
deleted. In keeping with the availability heuristic, what was out of 
sight was also out of mind. 
Overconfidence 
Knowing with certainty~ A particularly pernicious aspect of 
heuristics is that people typically have too muc~ confidence in judgments 
based upon them. In another follow-up to the study on causes of death, 
people were asked to indicate the odds that they were correct in choosing 
the more frequent of two lethal events (Fischhoff et al., 1977). Odds 
of 100:1 or greater were given often (25% of the time). However, about 
one out of every eight answers associated with such extreme confidence was 
wrong (fewer than 1 in 100 would have been wrong had the odds been 
appropriate). At odds of 10,000:1 people were wrong about 10% of the time. 
The psychological basis for this unwarranted certainty seems to be an 
ins~nsitivity to the tenuousness of the assumptions upon which one's judgments 
are based.· For example, extreme confidence in the incorrect assertion 
that homicides are more frequent than suicides may occur because people 
fail to appreciate that the greater ease of recalling instances of homicides 
is an imperfect basis for inference. 
Hyperprecision. Overconfidence manifests itself in other ways as 
well. A typical task in estimating uncertain quantities such as failure 
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rates is to set upper and lower bounds so that there is a certain fixed 
probability that the true value lies between them. Experiments with 
diverse groups of people making many different kinds of judgments have 
found that true values tend to lie outside of the confidence boundaries 
much too often. Results with 98% bounds are typical. Rather than 2% ·of 
the true values falling outside such bounds, 20-50% usually do so 
(Lichtenstein et al., 1977). Thus people think that they can estimate 
uncertain quantities with much greater precision than is actually the case. 
Overconfident experts. Unfortunately, once they are forced to go 
beyond their data and rely on judgment, experts may be as prone to over-
confidence as lay people. Fischhoff et:al. (1978) repeated their fault-tree 
study with professional automobile mechanics (averaging about 15 years of 
experience) and found them to be about as insensitive as lay persons to 
deletions from the tree. Hynes and Vanmarcke (1976) asked seven 
"internationally known" geotechnical engineers to predict the height of an 
embankment that would cause a clay foundation to fail and to specify 
confidence bounds around this estimate that were wide enough to have a 50% 
chance of enclosing the true failure height. None of the bounds specified 
by these individuals actually enclosed the true failure height. 
Further evidence of expert overconfidence may be found in many 
technical risk assessments. For e~ample, an official review of the Reactor 
Safety Study concluded that despite the study's careful attempt to 
calculate the pr.6bability of a core meltdown in a nuclear reactor, "we are 
~ertain that the error bands are understated. We cannot say by how much. 
Reasons for this include an inadequ~te data base, a poor statistical treatment 
[and] an inconsistent propagation of uncertainties throughout the calculation" 
(U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1978, p. vi). The 1976 collapse of 
the Teton Dam provides another case in point. The Committee on Government 
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Operations attributed this disaster to the unwarranted confidence of 
engineers who were absolutely certain they had solved the many serious 
problems that arose during construction (U.S. Government, 1976). 
Reconciling Divergent Opinions about Risk 
Both casual observation of risk debates and systematic empirical data 
suggest that experts and lay people have quite different perceptions about 
the riskiness of various technologies. Given'that they are prisoners of 
rather different experiences, such divergence is to be expected. One would 
like to believe that, as evidence accumualtes and the public and the experts 
come to share a common experience, their perceptions would converge towards 
one "appropriate" view. Unfortunately, this is not likely to be the case. 
A great deal of research indlca.tes that once formed, people's beliefs change 
.. , . ' -·. . 
very slowly, and are extraordinarily persistent in the face of contrary 
evidence (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Initial impressions tend to structure the 
way that subsequent evidence is interpreted. New evidence appears reliable 
and informative if it is consistent with one's initial belief~·,_ w,~~.r,~as 
contrary evidence is dismissed as unreliable, erroneous, or unrepresentative. 
Characteri~ing Perceived Risk 
In order to aid hazard management, a theory of perceived risk must 
explain people's extreme aversion to some hazards, their indifference to 
others, and the discrepancies bet~een these reactions and experts' 
recommendations. Why, for example, do some communities react vigorously 
against locating a liquid natural gas terminal in their vicinity despite 
the assurances of experts that it is safe? Why, on the other hand, do 
many communities s.ituated on earthquake faults or below great dams show 
little concern for experts' warnings? Over the past few years we have 
been attempting to answer such questions as these by examining the opinions 
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people express when they are asked, in a variety of ways, to characterize 
and evaluate hazardous activities and technologies (Slovic, Fischhoff & 
Lichtenstein, 1979 ,·.J9898:;~ Slovic, LichteI).stein & Fischhoff,.·. ·1f79) ._ This 
. .. ·- ~ -- . . -
descriptive research aims (a) to develop a taxonomy of risk characteristics 
that can be used ·to understand and predict societal responses to hazards 
and (b) to develop methods for assessing public opinions about risk in a 
way that could be useful for policy decisions. 
Quantifying Perceived Risk 
In one study, we asked four different groups of people to judge 30 
hazardous activities, substances and technologies according to the 
"present risk of death from each (across U.S. society as a whole)." Three 
groups were from Eugene, Oregon; they included 69 college students, 76 
members of the League of Women Voters (LOWV), and 47 business and 
professional members of the "Active Club." The fourth group was composed. 
of 15 experts in risk assessment. 
Tabl~ 1 rank orders the mean risk judgments for the four groups. 
There were many similarities between the three gr_<?ups of lay people. For 
example, each group believed that motorcycles, motor vehicles and handguns 
were highly risky, while vaccinations, home appliances, power mowers, and 
football posed relatively little risk •. However, there_·were strong differehces 
as well. Active Club members viewed pesticides as much less risky than 
did the other groups. Nuclear power was rated as highest in risk by the 
LOWV and student groups, but only eighth by the Active Club. The students 
viewed contraceptives as riskier and mountain climbing as safer than did 
the other lay groups. Experts' judgments of risk differed markedly from 
the judgments of lay people. The experts viewed electric power, surgery, 
swimming and X rays as more risky than did the other groups and they judged 
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nuclear power, police work and mountain climbing to be much less risky. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
What Determines Risk Perception? 
What did people mean, in this study, when they said that a particular 
technology was quite risky? A series of additional studies was addressed 
to this question. 
Perceived risk compared to frequency of death. When people judge risk, 
are they simply estimating frequency of death? To answer this question, 
we compared the risk judgments with technical estimates of the annual 
number of deaths for these hazards. The experts' judgments of risk were 
so closely related to the statistical (or calculated) frequencies that it 
seemed reasonable to conclude that they had good knowledge of the technical 
estimates and viewed "risk" as synonymous with these estimates. The risk 
judgments of lay people were, however, only moderately related to the annual 
death rates, raising the possibility that 1 risk means something different 
to them. 
Lay fatality estimates. Perhaps lay people base their risk judgments 
on ~ubjective fatality estimates which are inaccurate. To test this 
hypothesis, we asked additional groups of students and LOWV members to 
estimate how many people were likely to die in the U.S. in the next year 
(if the next year was an average year) as a consequence of these 30 
hazardous activities. If lay people equate risk with annual fatalities, 
their subjective fata~ity estimates, no matter how inaccurate, should 
resemble their risk judgments. We found, however, only a modest agreement 
between these two sets of judgments. Lay people's risk perceptions were, 
in fact, no more closely related to their own fatality estimates than they 
were to the technical estimates. Apparently, lay people incorporate other 
considerations besides annual fatalities into their concept of risk. 
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Disaster potential. One clue to these other considerations was the 
fact that the LOWV members and students judged nuclear power as highest 
in risk and lowest in annual. fatalities. One possible explanation is that 
they considered nuclear power to be a high risk technology because of its 
potential for disaster. Therefore, we asked these same respondents to 
indicate for each hazard, "how many times more deaths would occur if next 
I 
year were particularly disastrous rather than average." For most hazards 
these multipliers were quite small, indicating that people saw little 
potential for disaster. The striking exception was nuclear power. Applying 
each .person's disaster multiplier to their estimated fatalities for an 
average year, we found that almost 40% of the respondents expected more than 
10,000 fatalities from nuclear power if next year were a disastrous year. 
More than 25% expected 100,000 or more fatalities. 
Disaster potential seems to explain the discrepancy between the 
perceived risk and the annual fatality estimates for nuclear power. Yet, 
because disaster was judged significant for only a few of the hazards, it 
provided only a partial explanation of the perceived-risk data. 
Risk Characteristics. Our search for additional knowledge about risk 
perception led us to ask experts, students, LOWV members and Active Club 
members to rate the 30 items on nine characteristics that had been 
hypothesized as relevant to individual and societal reactions to hazards. 
These characteristics included the degree to which an activity's risks 
were voluntary, controllable, known to science, known to those exposed, 
familiar, dread, certain to be fatal, catastrophic, and immediately 
manifested. 
Mean ratings were quite similar for all four groups. Particularly 
interesting was the characterization of nuclear power, which had the dubious 
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distinction of scoring at or near the extreme on all of the undesirable 
characteristics. Its risks were seen as involuntary, delayed, unkno~, 
uncontrollabl~, unfamiliar, catastrophic, dread and fatal. This contrasted 
sharply with the characterizations of non-nuclear electric power and another 
radiation technology, X rays •. Electric power and X rays ~ere both judged 
more voluntary, less certain to be fatal, less catastrophic, less dreaded, 
more familiar, and less risky than nuclear power. 
Across all 30 hazards, ratings of dread and of the likelihood of a 
mishap being fatal were closely related to lay judgments of risk. In fact, 
the risk judgments of the LOWV and student groups could be predicted almost 
perfectly from ratings of dread and lethality and the subjective fatality 
estimates for normal and disastrous years. Experts' judgments of risk were 
not related to any of the nine risk characteristics. 
Many pairs of risk characteristics tended to be correlated with each 
other across the 30 activities and technologies. For example, risks faced 
voluntarily.were typically judged well known and controllable. These 
interrelations were sufficiently high to suggest that all the ratings could 
be explained in terms of a few basic dimensions of risk. In order to 
identify such dimensions, we conducted a factor analysis of the correlations 
from each group (principal components analysis with v.arimax rotation to 
simple structure). We found that the nine characteristics could be 
... 
represented by two underlying factors which appeared to be the same for 
each group. Figure 2 illustrates the factor scores for each hazard within 
the common space. Hazards at the high end of the vertical dimension or 
factor (e.g., food coloring; pesticides) tended to be new, unknown, 
involuntary, and delayed in their effects. Hazards at the other extreme 
of this factor (e.g., mountain climbing; swimming) had the opposite 
characteristics. High (right-hand) scores on the horizontal factor (e.g., 
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riuclear power; commercial aviation) were associated with events whose 
consequences were seen as certain to be fatal, often for large numbers. of 
people, should something go wrong. Hazards low on this factor (e.g., 
power mowers; football) were seen as causing injuries rather than fatalities, 
to single individuals. We have labeled the vertical factor as "Unknown Risk" 
and the horizontal factor as "Dread Risk. 11 In-·s,:;m, ev~11:-::th~ugh. the_ four g~oups 
had somewhat. drfferent perceptions ·of the riskine~s of . .the -·vario~s -hazards 
, •• - • ~ - - ~ - •, ""'\· ~ ~ - .1 - • - • • -·· -- - ~ -
(Table 1), they tended to characterize these hazards similarly. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
An Extended Study of Risk Perception, 
In the study reported above, diverse groups of people characterized 
risks in the same way. But the generalizability of the factors that emerged 
is limited t;o the particular hazards and characteristics studied. Therefore, 
our recent work has examined a broader set of hazards (90 instead of 30) 
and risk characteristics (18 instead of 9), using data collected from 
college students. The. 18 risk characteristics included eight from the 
earlier study, plus additional characteristics selected to represent other 
concerns thought to be important. These included the number of people 
exposed to the hazard, the degree to which the risks pose a threat to you 
(the rater) personally, threat to future generations, and threat of global 
catastrophe. ~.\-le -,~_i_~p: asked about the degree to which the activity's 
benefits are equitably distributed to those who bear the risks, the 
observability of the damage producing processes, the degree to which the 
risks are increasing and the ease of reducing the risks. 
Each of the 90 hazards was rated on overall riskiness and judged 
on all 18 characteristics of risk. In general, the risks from most of 
these activities were judged to be increasing, not easily reduced, and 
better known to science than to those people exposed to them. 
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As in the earlier studies, many pairs of risk characteristics were 
highly correlated with each other. Factor analysis showed that the 18 
characteristics could be represented well oy three factors, the first two 
of which resembled the two factors that emerged from the earlier studies. 
Factor 1 was associated with lack of control, fatal consequences, high 
catastrophic potential, reactions of dread, inequitable distribution of 
risks and benefits (including transfer of risks to future generations), 
and the belief that the risks are increasing and not easily reducable. 
Factor 1 thus seems to correspond closely to the factor labeled Dread Risk 
in the earlier study. Factor 2 was associated with risks that are unknown, 
unobservable, new, and delayed in their manifestation. It thus corresponded 
closely to Factor 1 (Unknown Risk) of the earlier study. Factor 3 was 
primarily determined by the number of people exposed and the rater's~ 
personal exposure. 
Scores for the individual items on Factors 1 and 2 are plotted in 
Figure 3. The hazards at the extremes on each dimension give support.to the 
factor D~~e~,~:"4i<:h -~~--~E{~{a,lly_ slit{r~i~ed _fron(examt~.!fr~C?n. qt__tJ:i~ ·se.t of 
· characteristics defining each factor. Items at the high end of Factor 1 
(nerve gas, nuclear power accidents, nuclear weapons, terrorism, warfare 
and crime) are all highly dreaded, in contrast to the items at the opposite 
end (home appliances, bicycles, christmas tree lights, .hair dyes). The 
locations of items on the vertical axis correspond to the degree to which 
their risks are perceived as known, familiar, and observable. Hazards 
falling at the high exposure end of Factor 3 (societal and personal exposure) 
were motor vehicle accidents, caffeine, alcoholic beverages,· smoking, food 
preservatives, herbicides and pesticides. Hazards falling at the low end 
on this factor included lasers, solar electricity, space exploration, 
laetrile,.scuba diving, and open-heart surgery. 
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Insert Figure 3 about here 
Our most recent study has examined 81 hazardous activities, including 
many more chemicals (e.g., 2,4,5-T, hexachlorophene, polyvinyl chloride) 
than were included in previous studies and numerous hazards whose risks 
were disaggregated (e.g., motor vehicle risks were partitioned into four 
separate items treating (a) accidents to vehicle occupants, pedestrians and 
cyclists; (b) auto racing; (c) carbon monoxide exhaust; and (d) airborne 
lead). Factor analysis, based on ratings of these hazards on the 18 risk 
characteristics, resulted in three factors almost identical to those of the 
previous study. 
We have found that lay people's risk perceptions and attitudes are 
closely related to the position of a hazard within the factor space. Most 
important is Dread Risk. The higher an activity's score on this factor 
(a) the higher its perceived risk; (b) the more people want its risks 
reduced; and (c) the more they want to see strict regulation employed to achieve 
the desired. reduction in risk (se·e Figure 4).. The perceptions of experts, 
however, appear much less closely- related to the factor space. 
------------- ----- -------------------------- ___ .:__ _______ _:_ ______ _ 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
1-------------------·--- ,--~~~,..=--=~_,.~,__..,._=---====-..,._~,..=""·----· -·---------~---· 
Social Implications 
In this section, we shall briefly describe two applied problems to 
which we believe this basic research·is relevant. One is the challenge of 
informing or educating people about risk. The second is the problem of 
understanding and forecasting public response towards new technologies, 
as illustrated by the case of nuclear power. Our coverage here will be 
brief. Further details about these two applications can be found in Slovic, 
Lichtenstein & Fischhoff (1979) and Slovic et al. (1980b). 
Informing People About Risk 
One dramatic change in people's outlook on life in recent years is 
their growing awareness of the risks they encounter in daily experience. 
15 
The consequence of this awareness has been increased pressure on the 
designers and regulators of hazardous enterprises to inform people about 
the risks they face (see Figure 5). For example: 
1. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is mandating patient 
information inserts for an increased number of prescription drugs. 
2. The. Department of Housing and Urban Development now requires the 
sellers of homes built before 1950 to inform buyers about the presence of 
lead-based paints. 
3. The White House has directed the Secretary of Health, Eduation, . 
and Welfare to deveJ_op a public information program on the health effects 
of radiation exposure. 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
----------------------=-===--~~~~~~~~~-
Despite good intentions, creating effective informational programs 
may be quite difficult. Doing an adequate job means finding cogent ways 
of presenting complex, technical material that is clouded by uncertainty 
and may be distorted by the listeners' preconceptions (and perhaps 
misconceptions) about the hazard and its consequences. For: as we have 
seen above, misleading personal experiences may sometimes promote a false 
sense of security, whereas in other circumstances, mere discussion of 
possible adverse consequences may enhance their apparent threat. Moreover, 
research has also demonstrated that people's beliefs change slowly and 
show ,extraordinary persistence ,in the face of cq_ntrary evidence. What 
,",' .. 
f.9}lows is a brief overview of some addLl:ional problems that information 
programs must confront. 
Presentation format is important. Subtle changes in the way that risks 
are expressed can have a major impact on perceptions. For example, Slovic 
et al. (1978) argued that motorists' reluctance to wear seat belts might 
be due to the extremely small probability of incurring a fatal accident 
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on a.single automobile trip. Since a fatal accident occurs only about 
once in every 3.5 million person-trips and a disabling injury only once in 
every 100,000 person-trips, refusing to buckle one's seat belt may seem 
quite reasonable. It looks less reasonable, however, if one adopts a 
multiple-trip perspective and considers the substantial probability of an 
accident on some trip. Over 50 years of driving (about 40,000 trips), 
the probability of being killed rises to .01 and the probability of 
experiencing at least one disabling injury is .33. We found that people 
asked to consider this lifetime perspective responded more favorably 
toward ,the use of seat belts (and air bags) than did people asked to consider 
a trip-by-trip perspective. 
Numerous other format effects have been documented in the literature 
on risk assessment. For example, merely fusing or splitting branches in 
a fault tree (without adding or substracting any information) affects 
people's perceptions; a given category of problems tends to be viewed as 
contributing more to failures when split into two branches than when 
presented as one branch. The same risk options, described in terms of 
lives saved, may be evaluated much differently than when framed in terms of 
lives lost. Details of these and other effects are given in Tversky and 
Kahneman (in press) and Slovic et al. (1980b). 
•----------------------------·-- ·------------------~----~------
The fact that,subtle differences in how risks are presented can have 
marked effects on perceptions and actions suggests that those responsible 
for information programs have considerable ability to manipulate perceptions. 
Moreover, since these effects are not widely known, people·may inadvertently 
be manipulating. their own perceptions by casual decisions they make about 
how to organize their knowledge. 
Cross-hazard comparisons may be misleading. One common approach to 
deepening people's perspectives is presenting quantified risk estimates for 
a variety of hazards. These presentations typically involve elaborate 
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tables and'even "catalogs of risks" in which diverse indices of death 
or disability are di$played for a .broad spectrum of life's hazards. Some 
of these provide extensive data on risks per hour of exposure showing, for 
example, that an hour of riding a motorcycle is as risky as an hour of 
being 75 years old. One analyst developed lists of activities, each of 
which is estimated to increase one's chances of death (in any year) by 
one in one million. Other analysts have ranked hazards in terms of their 
expected reduction in life expectancy. ThQse_who compile such data· typically 
assume- that they will be useful for ~_edsion making: 
Research on perceived risk implies that comparisons such as these 
will not, by themselves, be adequate guides to personal or public decision 
policies. Risk perceptions and attitudes appear to be determined not only 
by accident probabilities, annual mortality rates or the mean losse·s of,_ 
li·fe expectancy, out also by· numeroµs other· charact~risti"cs 
- ,, ... ~ - . - ' ~ . ' . ~- -
of hazards such as uncertainty, controllability, catastrophic potential, 
equity and threat to future generations. Within the perceptual space defined 
by these and other characteristics, each hazard is unique •. To many persons, 
statements such as "the annual risk from living near a nuclear power plant 
is equivalent to the risk of riding an extra three miles in an automobile" 
appear ludicrous because they fail to give adequate cons.ideration to the 
important differences in the nature of the risks from these two technologies. 
Conclusions. The development of programs to inform patients, workers 
and consumers about risk is an admirable goal. However, it is important 
to recognize the difficulties confronting such programs. There is need 
for extensive empirical research on the problems of communicating information 
about risk. Since every decision about the content and format of an 
information statement is likely to influence perception and behavior (and 
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ultimately product viability, jobs, electricity costs, com~liance with 
medical treatments and other high-stakes consequences), extreme care 
must be taken to select knowledgeable and trustworthy designers and 
program coordinators. Finally, it is important to recognize that\informing 
people, whether by warning labels, package inserts, or extensive media 
presentations, is but part of the larger problem of helping them cope with 
the risks and uncertainties of modern life. We believe that much of the 
responsibility lies with the schools, whose curricula should include 
material designed to teach people that the woFld in which they live is 
probabilistic, not deterministic, and to help them learn judgment and 
decision strategies for dealing with that world. These strategies are as 
necessary for navigating in a world of uncertain information as geometry 
and trigonometry are to navigating among physical objects. 
Forecasting Public Response: The Case of Nuclear Power 
Research on risk perception can help hazard managers and policy makers 
understand public attitudes and forecast future acceptance or rejection of 
new technologies. A case in point is nuclear power, whose isolated 
position in the perceptual space reflects our respondents' 
view that its risks are unknown, dread, uncontrollable, inequitable, 
catastrophic and likely to affect future generations. Once such concerns 
are identified, one can ask how likely they are to change over time in 
response to education, a good safety record, or an accident. 
Basic perceptions. Studies of people opposed to nuclear power show 
that they judge its benefits as quite low and its risks as unacceptably 
great (Slavic, Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1979). On the benefit side, 
opponents do not see ~uclear power as a vital link in meeting basic energy 
needs; rather many view it as a supplement to other sources of energy 
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which are themselves adequate. On the risk side, nuclear power evokes 
extreme feelings of dread. 
Though a number of commentators have speculated that people's strong 
fears of nuclear power stem from a belief that death from radiation· is 
somehow more horrible than death from other causes, our studies indicate 
that, instead, their fears appear to derive from concern over how many 
deaths are likely. Many people's mental images of a nuclear accident 
include the spectre of hundreds of thousands, even millions, of immediate 
deaths, accompanied by incalculable and irreversible damage to the 
environment. These images bear little resemblance to the views of industry 
officials '(and most technical experts), who expect redundant safety and 
containment systems to prevent almost all reactor accidents and limit the 
damage of those that do occur. Industry proponents have tended to attribute 
this perception gap to public ignorance and irrationality. 
We question this attribution and we doubt that its proposed remedy, 
education, will easily succeed. For although people's fears may be 
exaggerated, they are not divorced from reality. On the technical side, 
the ·.low probability of catastrophic nuclear mishaps makes demonstration of 
their improbability difficult from a statistical standpoint. Furthermore, 
people are aware that many of the "facts" of nuclear risks are in dispute 
and that experts have been wrong in the past, as when they irridiated 
enlarged tonsils or per.mitted observers to witness ·A-bomb tests at close 
range. On the psychological side, public concerns are triggered by reliance 
on memorability and imaginabili~y (the availability heuristic). The risks 
of nuclear power would seem to be a prime candidate for availability bias 
because of the extensive media coverage they receive and their association 
with the vivid, imaginable dangers of nuclear war. 
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One disturbing possibility is that objective discussions of nuclear 
safety may increase the imaginability of improbable mishaps, causing them, 
by the availability heuristic, to seem more likely. Consider an engineer 
arguing the safety of nuclear power by pointing out the improbability of 
the various ways radioactivity could be accidentally released. Rather than 
reassuring the audience, the presentation might lead them to think, "I didn't 
realize there were that many things that could go wrong." 
Whereas availability bias may contribute to the perception gap 
between pronuclear experts and their lay opponents, it does not point 
unambiguously to one side or the other as having the most accurate appraisal 
of the risks from nuclear power. Although reliance on imaginability, by 
blurring the distinction between what is remotely possible and what is 
probable, is capable of enhancing public fears, inability to imagine all 
the possible ways that systenscould fail might produce a false sense of 
security among technical experts. Insofar as the actual risks may never 
be known with great precision and the interpretation of new information 
is strongly influenced by one's prior beliefs, the perception gap may be 
with us for a long time. Thus, Three Mile Island "proved" the possibility 
of a catastrophic meltdown to some, whereas to others, it demonstrated the 
reliability of the multiple containment systems. 
A Nuclear Future? 
Are the strong fears and determined opposition to nuclear power likely 
to persist? Will nuclear power ever gain widespread public acceptance? 
Although answers to these questions are by no means clear, ·public response 
to X rays provides some clues. The almost universal acceptance of X rays 
shows that a radiation technology can be tolerated if its use is familiar, 
its benefits clear, and its practitioners trusted. In the case of nuclear 
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power, the path to respectability exemplified by X rays will have to 
be accompanied by an incontrovertible 'safety record. Research indicates 
that accidents occurring with unknown and potentially catas.trophic · 
technologies will be seen as signals that portend loss of control and 
,indicate further, and possibly severe, losses (Slavic et al., 1980a). 
Thus even "small" nuclear power accidents will likely have immense 
consequen~es for the industry and for society. 
A quicker path to acceptance, and one that may provide the primary 
hope for the industry, could be forged by a severe energy shortage. Society 
has shown itself willing to accept increased risks in exchange for increased 
benefits. Brownouts, blackouts, or rationing of electricity would likely 
enhance the perceived need for nuclear power and increase public tolerance 
of its risks. Such crisis-induced acceptance of nuclear p_ower may, however, 
produce anxiety, stress and conflict in a population forced to tolerate 
what it perceives as great risk because of its addiction to the benefits 
of electricity. 
Conclusion 
The study of human cognitive processes indicates that making 
intelligent decisions about risky activities is a very difficult task. It 
also raises a number-of critical questions: Gaµ. society rise above.the 
limitations of individual minds? Are new technologies forcing us to make 
decisions that we cannot make well (or successfully)? Should we take 
smaller steps in our technological development, so that we can recover 
from the inevitable mistakes? What kind of political institutions are 
needed to preserve democratic freedoms and insure public participation 
for problems involving technical complexity, catastrophic risks, and great 
uncertainty? If public debates and communications from experts do little 
to allay fears. and, indeed, may exacerbate them, how should we structure 
r·- ,,_.,,,._ --- ____ __..._,_ --
public participation? What role can education play in helping society 
understand and cope with risk? 
Although the study of individual human minds is a rather narrow 
starting point for examining societal risk decisions, it appears to lead 
quickly to important issues that need to be addressed by the entire com-
munity of scientists' policy makers' .and ci ti~eris ... 
. ·'·--- ... 
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Table 1 
ORDERING OF PERCEIVED RISK FOR 30 ACTIVITIES AND TECHNOLOGIES8 
Group 1 Group2 Group 3 Group 4 , 
LOWV COLLEGE ACTIVE CLUB EXPERTS 
STUDENTS MEMBERS 
Nuclear power 1 1 8 20 
Motor vehicles 2 5 3 1 
Handguns 3 2 1 4 
Smoking 4 3 4 2 
Motorcycles 5 6 2 6 
Alcoholic. beverages 6 7 5 3 
General (private) aviation 7 15 11 12 
Police work 8 8 7 17 
Pesticides 9 4 15 8 
Surgery 10 11 9 5 
Fire fighting 11 10 6 18 
Large construction 12 14 13 13 
Hunting 13 18 10 23 
Spray cans 14 13 23 26 
Mountain climbing 15 22 12 29 
Bicyles 16 24 14 15' 
Commercial aviation 17 16 18 16 
Electric power 18 19. 19 9 
Swimming 19 30 17 10 
Contraceptives 20 9 22 11 
Skiing 21 25 16 30 
X-rays 22 17 24 7 
High school & college footb~II 23 26 21 27 
Railroads 24 23 20 19 
Food preservatives 25 12 28 14 
Food coloring 26 20 30 21 
Power mowers 27 28 25 28 
Prescription antibiotics 28 21 26 24 
Home appliances 29 27 27 22 
Vaccinations 30 29 29 25 
a The orderia& Is based on the geometrlc mean risk ratings within each group. Ra:ok 1 repre.seota the 
most risky activity or technoloa. 
Figure Captions 
1. Relationship between judged frequency and the actual number of deaths 
per year for 41 causes of death. Source: Lichtenstein et al. (1978). 
2. Location of 30 hazards within the two-factor space obtained from 
LOWV, student, Active Club and expert groups. Connected lines join 
or enclose the loci of four group points for each hazard. Open 
circles represent -data from the expert group. Unattached points 
represent groups that fall within the triangle created by the other 
three groups. 
3. Hazard locations on Factors 1 and 2 of the three-dimensional 
structure derived from the interrelationships among 18 risk 
characteristics. Factor 3 (not shown) reflects ,the number of 
people exposed to the hazard and the degree of one's personal 
exposure. Source: Slovic et al. (1980a). 
4. Attitudes towards regulation of the hazards shown in Figure 3. 
The larger the dot, the greater the desire for strict regulation 
to reduce risk. 
5. Drawing by S. Harris;@l979. 
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Figure 1. Relationship between judged frequency and the actual riumoer of 
deaths per year for 41 causes of death. 
Source: Slavic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1979. 
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Figure 3., Hazard locations on Factors 1 and 2 of the three-dimensional 
structure derived from the interrelationships among 18 risk characteristics. 
Factor 3 (not shown) reflects the number of people exposed to the hazard 
and the degree of one's personal exposure. Source: Slavic et al., 1980a. 
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Attitudes towards regulation of the hazards shown in 
The larger the dot, the greater the desire for strict 
to reduce risk. 
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Figure 5. Drawing by S. Harris; © 1979 
The New Yorker Magazine, Inc. 
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